Hamiache's recent axiomatization of the well-known Shapley value for TU games states that the Shapley value is the unique solution verifying the following three axioms: the inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency. Driessen extended Hamiache's axiomatization to the enlarged class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative.
Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU) is a pair N, v , where N is a nonempty, finite set and v : 2 N → R is a characteristic function, defined on the power set of N , satisfying v(∅) = 0. An element of N (notation: i ∈ N ) and a subset S of N (notation: S ⊆ N or S ∈ 2 N with S = ∅) are called a player and coalition respectively, and the associated real number v(S) is called the worth of coalition S. The size of coalition S is denoted by s. Particularly, n denotes the size of the player set N . We denote by G the universal game space consisting of all these TU-games. In this paper, a TU-game N, v is always denoted by its column vector of worths of all coalitions S ⊆ N in the traditional order (one-person coalitions are at the top, etc.), i.e. v = (v(S)) S⊆N,S =∅ . If no confusion arises, we write v instead of v. We only consider games with at least two players. A game N, v is said to be inessential if for all coalitions S ⊆ N , v(S) = i∈S v({i}).
The solution part of cooperative game theory deals with the allocation problem of how to divide the overall earnings the amount of v(N ) among the players in the TU-game. There is associated a single allocation called the value of the TU-game. Formally, a value on G is a function Φ that assigns a single payoff vector Φ(N, v) = (Φ i (N, v)) i∈N ∈ R n to every TU-game N, v ∈ G. The so-called value Φ i (N, v) of player i in the game N, v represents an assessment by i of his gains for participating in the game.
Among all the values for TU-games, the Shapley value is the best known ( [1, 6, 8] ). The Shapley value is also a striking example of the power of the axiomatic approach. The eldest axiomatization of the Shapley value is stated by Shapley himself ( [8] ) by referring to four properties called efficiency, symmetry, linearity, and dummy player property. In the framework of values for TU-games, firstly let us review several essential properties treated in former axiomatizations of the Shapley value. A value Φ on the universal game space G is said to be efficient, if i∈N converges to the value Φ(N,v). Hamiache's recent axiomatization of the Shapley value states that the Shapley value is the unique one-point solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency (see [3] ). In his paper, an associated game N, v Sh λ is constructed. And a sequence of games is also defined, where the term of order m, in this sequence, is the associated game of the term of order m − 1. He showed that this sequence of games converges and that the limit game is inessential. The value is obtained using the inessential game property, the associated consistency and the continuity axioms. As a by-product, neither the linearity nor the efficiency axioms are needed. In [2] , Driessen extended Hamiache's axiomatization to the enlarged class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative. For this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value are exploited in order to present a uniform approach to obtain axiomatizations of such values with reference to a slightly adapted inessential game property, continuity, and a similar associated consistency. The uniqueness proofs in Hamiache's axiomatization and Driessen's axiomatic characterization are rather tough and full of combinatorial calculations.
In cooperative game theory, linear transformations of games are widely used, for instance the dual of a game. Another well-known example is that any cooperative game can be represented as a linear combination of the unanimity games. On the other hand, there are many linear values such as the Shapley value that can be represented as a linear combination of all the worths v(S), S ⊆ N . So algebraic representations and matrix analysis should be a justifiable technique in cooperative game theory. This motivates our present work.
In this paper, the matrix approach is adopted to develop Hamiache's axiomatization of Shapley value and Driessen's extended work. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of row (resp. column)-coalitional matrix in the framework of cooperative game theory. Particularly, both the Shapley value and the associated game are represented algebraically by their coalitional matrices called the Shapley standard matrix M Sh and the associated transformation matrix M λ , respectively. The diagonalization procedure of M λ and the inessential property for coalitional matrices are fundamental tools to prove the convergence of the sequence of repeated associated games as well as its limit game to be inessential. In Section 3, the associated consistency for the Shapley value is formulated as the matrix equality M Sh = M Sh · M λ . We achieve a matrix approach for Hamiache's axiomatization of the Shapley value. In Section 4, a similar matrix approach is applicable to study Driessen's axiomatization of a certain class of linear values. To conclude with, matrix analysis is a new and powerful technique for research in the field of cooperative game theory.
2 The Shapley standard matrix and the associated transformation matrix
Firstly, let us define a new type of matrix to apply matrix theory to cooperative game theory.
Definition 1. A matrix M is called a row (resp. column)-coalitional matrix if its rows (resp. columns) are indexed by coalitions S ⊆ N in the traditional order (one-person coalitions are at the top, etc.). And a row-coalitional matrix
Without going into details, we recall the well-known Shapley value Sh(N, v) as follows:
Because of its linearity property, the Shapley value can be represented by the Shapley standard matrix as follows. 
where the matrix
Now let us recite the definition of the associated game in [3] . Given any game N, v and λ ∈ R, define its associated game N, v Sh λ as follows: 
In order to apply matrix theory, we introduce the associated transformation matrix to represent the associated game and the sequence of repeated associated games as follows. 
is both row-coalitional and column-coalitional defined by
otherwise.
And its sequence of repeated associated games
Now the main goal is to investigate eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the associated transformation matrix M λ . Let I be the identity matrix. 
By this equation, for any
So, we obtain
Applying the latter equality to one-person coalitions, it holds x N = j∈N x j . So we conclude
From the inessential property of any eigenvector x corresponding to eigenvalue 1, it follows immediately that the dimension of the eigenspace of eigenvalue 1 is equal to n.
Then the following system of linear equations holds,
For the case of S = N , since k · x N = 0 and k = 0, we have x N = 0. In the sequel, we show that for any k, there are
That is
Considering s = n − 2 and S = N \ {i, j}, by (1) and (2), we conclude
If k = 2, these linear equations are identical equations for all coalitions S with s = n − 2, total
In view of (2) and (3), for a given k, we use induction on n − s to show that
Now suppose (4) is true for all n − s ≤ t − 1, where t ≤ k. For the case of n − s = t, let S = N \ T . By (1), we have
By the inductive assumption and i ∈ T , we obtain
So if t = k, then (5) implies that (4) holds for s = n − t.
Here we recall some results in algebraic theory for getting more properties of the associated transformation matrix M λ .
Lemma 2.3 (Algebraic results, cf. [4]).
Let A be a square matrix of order p.
The dimension d of the solution space of the linear system of equations
A x = 0 satisfies d = p − rank(A).
For every eigenvalue of matrix A, its (algebraic) multiplicity is at least the dimension of the corresponding eigenspace.

The sum of the multiplicities of all eigenvalues of matrix A equals the order p.
The matrix A is diagonalizable if and only if the sum of the dimensions of the distinct eigenspaces equals p, and this happens if and only if the dimension of the eigenspace for each eigenvalue equals the multiplicity of the eigenvalue.
Theorem 2.4. Eigenvalues of the associated transformation matrix
, and multiplicities corresponding to these eigenvalues are
. By Proposition 2.1 and 2.2, we know that u k (k = 1, 2, · · · , n) are eigenvalues of M λ . Let d k denote the dimension of the eigenspace corresponding to (u k I − M λ ) x = 0. By Proposition 2.1, we obtain d 1 = n, whereas from Proposition 2.2 and Lemma 2.3 (1), we derive
Since the multiplicity m k of eigenvalue u k satisfies m k ≥ d k , we have
k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n and so the matrix M λ has no other eigenvalues.
From Theorem 2.4, we conclude that the matrix M λ is diagonalizable. In order to prove the next theorem, we make use of the following properties of row-coalitional matrices.
Lemma 2.5. Let M be a row-coalitional matrix and A be a matrix.
If M is row-inessential, then the row-coalitional matrix M A is row-inessential.
If A is invertible, then M A is row-inessential if and only if M is row-inessential.
3. For every game N, v ∈ G, if M is row-inessential, then the new game N, M · v is inessential.
where − → m S is the row vector of M indexed by a coalition S.
Now we present the following important properties of the associated transformation matrix M λ by its diagonalization procedure and Proposition 2.1.
Lemma 2.6. Let M λ be the associated transformation matrix.
The row-coalitional matrix P D equals
P D = [ − → x 1 , − → x 2 , · · · , − → x n , 0, · · · , 0] and P D is row- inessential, where column vectors − → x i (i = 1, 2, · · · n) are different
eigenvectors of M λ corresponding to eigenvalue 1 and 0 denotes a zero column vector.
Using the previous results, we derive the next theorem about the convergence of the sequence of repeated associated games. Proof. By the second conclusion of Lemma 2.6, lim
Due to Lemma 2.5 (3) andṽ = P DP −1 · v, the game N,ṽ is inessential whenever the matrix P DP −1 is row-inessential. By Lemma 2.6 (3), the matrix P D is row-inessential. Together with Lemma 2.5 (2) it follows that the matrix P DP −1 is row-inessential too. This completes the proof. Remark 1. Notice that the limit game N,ṽ of the sequence of repeated associated games merely depends on the game N, v asṽ = P DP −1 v. And for any player i ∈ N , the limit worthṽ({i}) is just the inner product of the i−th row vector of P DP −1 and the column vector v.
Associated consistency and the Shapley value
In this section we apply the results from the previous section to develop a matrix approach for Hamiache's axiomatization of the Shapley value (see [3] ). Firstly, we recall Hamiache's system of axioms: Here the associated consistency means that any player receives the same payments in the original game and in the associated game. In matrix theory, as the following lemma cites, the Shapley standard matrix M Sh is invariant under multiplication with the associated transformation matrix M λ . 
Lemma 3.1. The Shapley value verifies the associated consistency, that is
Its proof is listed in the appendix, as well as the algebraic interpretation for the associated consistency.
Theorem 3.2 (cf. [3] ). For 0 < λ < 2 n , the Shapley value is the unique value verifying the associated consistency, inessential game property, and continuity.
Proof by Matrix Approach. Obviously, the Shapley value satisfies the inessential game and the continuity axioms, and by Lemma 3.1 the Shapley value verifies the associated consistency.
So, let us now turn to the unicity proof. Consider a value Φ satisfying these three axioms. Since the limit game N,ṽ is shown to be inessential in Theorem 2.7, the inessential game property for Φ yields Φ i (N,ṽ) =ṽ({i}) for all i ∈ N . In summary, Φ(N, v) = (ṽ({i})) i∈N . Similarly, since the Shapley value also verifies these three axioms, it follows that 
That is,
Analogical to the matrix approach for the associated game, we restate the B−associated game as follows. 
where the matrix M B λ is both row-coalitional and column-coalitional defined by 
Proof.
For any coalition S and T , we have
Thus, the similarity property
From the similarity property of conclusion 1, it is known that M B λ and M λ have the same eigenvalues and the same multiplicities of eigenvalues. Let y be an eigenvector of M B λ corresponding to eigenvalue µ. Then
Clearly, µ is an eigenvalue of M λ and B y is an eigenvector corresponding to µ.
3. It is derived immediately from conclusion 1 and Lemma 2.6 (2). The explicit relationship between the Shapley value and any efficient, symmetric, and linear value is listed in the following theorem and the algebraic formulation in the subsequent corollary. According to the next theorem, the B−associated game is well chosen in order to guarantee that the corresponding efficient, symmetric, and linear value ψ satisfies the B−associated consistency. 
From Proposition 4.1 (1) and Lemma 3.1 respectively, we derive
This completes the proof. 
By Lemma 2.6 (3), the matrix P D is row-inessential, and it follows from Lemma 2.5 (2) that the matrix P DP −1 B is row-inessential too. Hence, by Lemma 2.5 (3), the game is N, Bv inessential, i.e. the limit game N,v is B−inessential . So far, we have presented three properties of a value on G, which are the B−inessential game property, continuity, and B−associated consistency. In the following we show that any efficient, symmetric, and linear value verifies these three properties. 
Conclusions about matrix analysis
The paper deals with the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative. Concerning the matrix approach for the B−associated consistency of such values, especially the associated consistency of the Shapley value, the next three tables summarize the relevant matrices, games and their mutual relationships.
Matrix
Name of matrix Value/Game Definition 
